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Abstract: Cyber security is one of the most attention seeking 
issues with the increasing advancement of technology specifically 
when the network availability is threaten by attacks such as Denial 
of Service attacks (DoS), Distributed DoS attacks (DDoS), and 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS). The loss of the 
availability and accessibility of cloud services have greater impacts 
than those in the traditional enterprises networks. This paper 
introduces  a new technique to mitigate the impacts of attacks which 
is called Enhanced DDoS-Mitigation System (Enhanced DDoS-
MS) that helps in overcoming the determined security gap. The 
proposed technique is evaluated experimentally and the result 
shows that the proposed method adds lower delays as a result of the 
enhanced security. The paper also suggests some future directions 
to improve the proposed framework. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The word security is widely used with cloud computing. The 
outcomes of the survey that is carried out by [1] shows that 
almost 90% of respondents are concerned with the security of 
the cloud. The cloud computing industry is mostly influenced 
by the users trust on the available security measures that can 
safeguard their services and data. 
The security issues related to the cloud computing include 
virtualization issues, privacy breach, and specific legal 
challenges. The significance of these issues cannot be 
neglected for the acquisition of a confidence of the 
participants as they will not be worried for their protection 
while existing in the cloud environment. 
Availability is a crucial element and mostly targeted by the 
attackers in cloud computing. Availability is considered 
equally with the security in cloud computing as its clients 
need to get the same accessibility to their data on the cloud as 
if it is in their local machines.  
Despite of other security issues that will be mentioned in this 
study, the availability challenges linked with cloud 
computing will get more attention. The availability is more 
open to threats such as the Denial of Service (DoS), 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and the Economic 
Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks and their detailed 
explanation will be presented in the next sections of this 
study. Moreover, there is information provided about the 
principles of the attacks, launch of such attacks, and their 
variants. The existing mitigation solutions that are proposed 
to protect the availability are evaluated in terms of their 
strong aspects and their limitations.   
This paper enhances the previous work of the authors [2] by 
evaluating the Enhanced DDoS-Mitigation System 
(Enhanced DDoS-MS) performance in order to prove its 
effectiveness in protecting the targeted system with low 
response time for the legitimate users. 
The problems that can occur in the future times are presented 
through three standpoints in the last section of this paper. 
These are: 
 Arising security issues in the context of cloud 
computing. 
 Arising issues in the context of DDoS (Distributed 
Denial of Service attacks). 
 Arising issues in the Enhanced DDoS-MS framework 
context  
Cloud computing refers to the computing model in which 
delivery of applications and services to the end-user are done 
through the internet as an on-demand service. All these 
services and applications are delivered to the clients by 
means of the Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) that own and 
control huge data centers all over the world. These data 
centers have high-grade servers that interlinked together to 
form the cloud that hosts web servers and web applications 
[3]. The extensively attractive characteristics of cloud 
include elasticity, flexibility, scalability, and its availability.  
These specified characteristics enable the clients of the cloud 
to acquire advantages unswervingly when they subscribe to 
the cloud. Such advantages include increasing storage 
capacity, cost reduction, reduction of the IT relative issues.  
The cloud services are presented to the clients based on their 
types in three categories. These are public cloud, private 
cloud and hybrid cloud. Furthermore, the subscription of 
services of cloud can be at various levels which are 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service 
(SaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS). Nevertheless, 
cloud clients and providers face a potential threat of security 
which is elaborated in this section. Such security concerns 
are classified into four categories that are described below 
[4]: 
 Policy and Organizational Risks including 
compliance risk, loss of control, end of service, and 
portability issue. 
 Physical Security Issues. 
 Technical Risks such as encryption issues, Network 
Attacks including Man in the Middle Attack 
(MITM), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), 
port scanning, IP spoofing , service outages, 
virtualization vulnerabilities, job starvation issues, 
data level security, web application security issues, 
data segregation, multi-tenancy security. 
421 
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                     Vol. 9, No. 3, December 2017 
 
 Legal Issues such as data breach, data location, Data 
Deletion, and contracts designing and commitment. 
a) Denial of Service (DOS) 
In this section, we are going to talk about the variants of DoS 
attacks, their amplified versions, and their mitigation 
methods. The DoS can be generated to affect networks 
through different layers such as network, transport, or 
application layers. The significance of availability cannot be 
ignored as it is an important characteristic of any network or 
service. The flooding or Denial of service (DoS) attack 
harms this significant feature by prohibiting the legitimate 
customers from accessing the network resources. To serve 
the purpose of consuming servers processing power and the 
network capacity (bandwidth), the attackers commence 
producing DoS attacks by means of transmitting countless 
requests so the legitimate users become incapable of 
accessing the network even they are eligible for legitimate 
access to the network resources [5]. 
The protection of cloud is significant. It needs to be confined 
from three types of intimidations that floods the web page. 
These types are utilizing the system resources that affects the 
computational capacity, downloading large files from the 
web server which influences its communication capabilities 
and the bandwidth, and using password guessing attacks and 
SQL injections [6]. The attack stream against a static web 
page are launched through bonnets, computer viruses, or 
other available denial of Service tool. The flood might be 
harmful as a Denial of Service attack or normal event like 
flash crowd phenomenon. [7] defined the flash crowd as an 
event of utilizing a famous and known website by a very 
huge number of users simultaneously which causes a rush in 
traffic that renders the website inaccessible. 
The differentiation between the Denial of Service and the 
flash crowd is significant. The Denial of Service results from 
large amount of requests that are suddenly demanded by a 
tiny set of known and new clients whereas the flash crowd 
results from large amount of requests that are demanded by a 
large number of legitimate clients after a specific social 
occasion [7]. This section focuses only on the Denial of 
Service (Dos) phenomenon. 
b) Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)  
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are DoS 
attacks that are launched by distributed sources 
simultaneously. To protect the network from such threats, 
many security measures have been developed including:- 
1. Filtering methods (based on attack patterns or threshold 
value) 
2. Overlay-based mitigation techniques (employing 
distributed firewalls and concealing the defended server’s 
location) 
3. Trace-back methods (marking the malicious packets and 
trace their origins) 
4. Push back methods (applying the process of filtration by 
the routers near the sources) 
Nevertheless, the current solution limitation lies on the 
absence of the source’s verification or the increase of the 
response time for the benign users. The computers that are 
employed in the flooding attacks are mostly infected by 
worms so their owners are unaware that they are a part of a 
malicious attack. The intention of the attacker is to generate a 
network of computers that is fully controlled by him to 
ensure the achievement of his attack. The attacker 
commences with penetrating the victims computers in order 
to create backdoors on them so he would easily manages 
them for a long duration. These penetrated computers are 
commonly known as bots or zombies. The attacker 
successfully manages the bots he can generates several kinds 
of attacks. One of these attacks is the DDoS. [7, 8, 9] 
c) Economic DDOS  
In the modern era of cloud computing, a new sort of DDoS 
attacks known as Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) 
came into being and was presented by [10]. EDoS can be 
defined as the “packet downpour that stretches the suppleness 
of metered-services engaged by a server For example; a 
cloud based server”.  
An EDoS attack can be launched by distantly motivating bots 
to overwhelm the targeted cloud service utilizing bogus 
requests which are concealed from security breach detectors. 
Hence, the cloud service will be provided to the requester in 
an on-demand basis in a scalable manner. The cloud is highly 
dependent on pay per use base so that the customer’s bill will 
be charged for these bogus requests, forcing the client to 
depart from the cloud service [11].  
The most of the dreadful impact of such drawbacks will be 
resulting in loss of clients of cloud computing as they will 
prefer choosing an inexpensive and more effective mean to 
handle their business on their premises and data center 
instead of the cloud that charges them for unreal requests 
[12][13]. 
EDoS attack is actually an enhanced economic version of the 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack with distinctive 
and more dangerous effect as the DDoS attacks majorly flood 
the targeted servers and create a huge amount of traffic in it 
which makes the network inaccessible for legitimate users. It 
is a great challenge for DDoS attack to be succeeded in 
harming the cloud as it has a large pool of resources, but the 
adversaries can launch their attacks against the weaker side 
which is the cloud customer’s network. In such scenario, a 
vast quantity of bogus requests will be sent to the client’s 
system which is successfully served by the cloud provider 
according to a specific contract that ensures responding to the 
high demands of the customer by scaling up the requested 
infrastructure. This process will charge the customer’s bill. 
Therefore, in customer’s opinion the cloud is highly 
expensive and unaffordable. The provider’s profit can be 
affected by spreading the same feeling among many clients.  
The authors of [14] divided the network security attacks into 
two sorts which are destructive and highly expensive. 
Comparatively, it is obvious that the DDoS attack is a 
destructive attack whereas the EDoS is extremely expensive. 
As a result of the above discussion, the solution for the EDoS 
attacks must be a proactive solution. This means that it must 
be implemented in the customer’s network in order to protect 
it from DDoS attacks and protect the provider from EDoS 
attacks. 
Many methods are proposed to solve this issue. However, 
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these techniques are either verifying all received packets 
from a source which causes latency or sometimes verifying 
the first packet only excluding any more tests, which is not 
adequate to defend the system. The concept of limiting the 
response time is very significant as well as offering a strong 
protection against the destructive attacks. The authors of [14] 
actually persuaded on the significance of such concept as the 
organizations must offer a balance between providing 
security and their customers’ convenience.  It is under the 
cloud concept to designate a threshold value for the 
customer’s usage in order to protect their bills as the cloud 
services must be scalable, elastic, metered by utilization, has 
shared pool of resources, accessible through the internet, and 
provided as an on-demand self-service according to the most 
agreed definition of the cloud service which is the NIST 
definition [15]. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
The countermeasure approaches of Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) are branched into two types i.e. proactive 
and reactive [15] : 
I. Proactive Approach: it involves the solutions like 
overlay-based approach that treats the data packets before 
they access the protected system as they have the filters along 
with the other mechanisms. Furthermore, they are highly 
reliant on the nodes or distributed firewall for the purpose of 
concealing the protected server’s location [16, 15]. 
II. Reactive Approach: such as the filtering mechanism 
that endeavors to alleviate the attack after its arrival to the 
protected system. These approaches are in question due to 
their precision in differentiating the legitimate packets from 
the malicious ones along with their effectiveness in 
formulating a profound filtering system lessening the impact 
of attacks in the targeted server [17]. 
There are certain drawbacks of the filtering approaches as 
stated below [15]: 
a.  Once an attacker penetrates the account of a legitimate 
user, the user’s IP address can be used to access the system 
files and to cause harm to it. 
b. The filtering systems work by first identifying the 
statistical anomalies or the known attack patterns. The 
problem is that these patterns and anomalies can be easily 
modified rendering the filtering system inaccurate. 
The filtering systems process all packets in order to accept or 
drop them. So, they increase the response time and affect the 
system performance and availability [15]. Nevertheless, the 
efficiency of proactive approaches is better than that of the 
reactive approaches when they act with the DDoS attacks due 
to the fact that the malicious attacks are dropped before they 
access the targeted system. 
Five existing mechanisms for handling the DDoS attacks will 
be presented in this section. This includes SOS, Kill-Bots, 
FOSEL, CLAD, and DaaS. CLAD will be provided in detail 
below while the remaining mechanisms will be described in a 
brief manner. 
Cloud-Based Attack Defense System (CLAD): 
The main objective of the CLAD is to secure the web servers 
through the provision of a strong security system in the shape 
of a network service which is usually operated on the vast 
structure of cloud (as a super computer) protecting from 
flooding attacks [17]. This super computer helps in 
overcoming the network layer attacks against any CLAD 
node which is a web proxy that is running on an application 
or virtual machine. The CLAD approach consists of a 
coalition of CLAD nodes and a DNS server where every 
CLAD node serves the function of a web proxy. It has 
diverse controlling initiatives that include admission control, 
congestion control initiatives, network layer filtering, 
authentication and pre-emption [17]. 
The concealment of the protected server from the public is 
quite relevant as the server may comprise of a sole server or a 
group of servers and merely allows the traffic which comes 
from the CLAD nodes to access the network. Furthermore, 
only CLAD nodes are aware of the IP address of the 
protected server so the DNS server response back to any 
received request from the internet with the IP address of a 
CLAD node. 
A specific small file is fetched to exchange the healthy status 
of every CLAD node with its neighbors. The health status of 
the CLAD nodes are actually maintained by the authoritative 
DNS server that allocates the healthy CLAD nodes at the 
local DNS servers within a blink of an eye which makes the 
user in real time to choose the healthy CLAD node. 
A session table holds active HTTP session keys where its 
optimum size can be determined by the present concurrent 
users. When the amount of created active HTTP session keys 
is decreased it refers to the admission control. A user can 
easily access the protected server by means of a CLAD 
system through a valid HTTP session key which is done for a 
specific time as the session key is saved in the cookie or 
attached with its URL. The other way of creating a session 
key is by hashing the user IP address and the expiration time 
utilized by a private hash function. 
System of CLAD Works in the Following Way: 
A client request is received by the DNS server that responses 
back with the IP address of a CLAD node which is chosen by 
determining its health status or load. Consequently, the client 
is verified by the CLAD node by means of a graphical turing 
test and afterwards allocates a session key further used to get 
the validation of the CLAD node if the user passes the test. It 
further transmits the request of the client to the protected web 
server [17]. 
The latency of CLAD is elevated due to all the packets of the 
clients must passing the components of the overlay system. 
The cloud infrastructure that serves the purpose of a network 
service, which safeguards the targeted web server, provides 
the web traffic access through it after ensuring that the 
request received is a HTTP request and drops the other 
traffics other than that. Moreover, the infrastructure of CLAD 
is only compatible for small enterprises.  
More DDoS Countermeasures: 
[18] proposed SOS as a reactive approach whereas the 
authors of [19] assert that SOS is known to be the first 
solution which utilized overlay techniques by which the 
target network indirect the received packets along with 
concealing the location of its protected web server to fight 
against the DoS attacks. In accordance with the view of [20] 
that SOS disallows the benign and anonymous users to access 
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the web servers and it also makes reaching to the protected 
server difficult for the users, it further protects the web server 
from getting an attack by providing a huge number of 
resources for which an attacker is required to formulate a 
successful attack. The major disadvantage of this technique is 
that the threats usually arise from spoofed IP addresses where 
they have the capability of launching DDoS attacks into any 
internal firewall. The limiting of response time in this 
technique is ignored in this case too. 
Another reactive approach with the name of Kill-Bots is 
suggested by [21] that serve the function of a kernel 
extension for the protection of web servers from the 
application-layer DDoS attacks. It also makes use of the 
CAPTCHA for the verification of clients. Further, it alters 
the three-way handshake procedure linked to the TCP 
connection for safeguarding the verification approaches from 
flooding attacks as it does not establish a new socket until 
ending the TCP handshake procedure, as illustrated by [21]. 
Besides its advantages, it has certain drawbacks like it has 
increased the complexity as it enables the clients to test 
CAPTCHA many times, with the help of applying a bloom 
filter and admission control. At the same time, the risk is 
increased in this mechanism as it applies the protection 
approach on the server where it should be executed on the 
network edge which is the firewall. In this technique, the 
response time is elevated to a great extent due to the 
implementation of the prior mentioned factors. 
Lastly, DaaS is a framework that is proposed by [11]. It 
establishes a metered pool comprising of resources that 
exceeding their counterpart in the botnets in order to simplify 
the process of controlling the idle resources which are free 
from usage. DaaS has more potency of elevating the response 
time as compared to prior mechanisms. Despite of all its 
merits, DaaS mechanism is not adequate to counteract the 
DDoS attacks by only utilizing the tool of puzzles due to 
their own drawbacks. 
 
EDoS Countermeasures: 
 
To protect the cloud from the EDoS attacks, there is a 
number of techniques have been proposed such as EDoS-
Shield Framework, Shenai & Sandar approach, Enhanced 
EDoS-Shield Framework, and the In-Cloud eDDoS 
Mitigation Web Service. In the next subsections, there will 
be a brief description of the EDoS-Shield Framework and the 
In-Cloud eDDoS Mitigation Web Service (Scrubber Service) 
while the in-depth discussions are given in regard with the 
Enhanced EDoS-Shield Framework and the Shenai & Sandar 
approach. 
1) Enhanced EDoS-Shield Framework 
[22] developed a framework which is called the Enhanced 
EDoS-Shield to counteract the EDoS attacks which are 
generated by spoofed IP addresses. The key components are 
virtual firewalls (VF) and a cloud-based verifier node (V-
Nodes). The firewall functions as a filter containing white 
and black lists that accumulate the IP addresses of the 
originating sources, Time to Live (TTL)  values, a counter of 
unmatched Time to Live values in the black and white lists, 
and attack’s initiating start time in the black list [21]. The 
framework developers utilized the Time-to-Live (TTL) value 
which is a field in the IP header to help identify the IP 
spoofed packet, i.e. packets developed from fake IP address. 
By making use of TTL, this method avoids declining a 
request from a user IP address that is placed on the blacklist. 
On the contrary, it examines the packet as it may be 
originated from a person who was a victim of an IP address 
spoofing attempt in the past. So, it stops DoS attacks on 
legitimate users if their IP addresses have been misused. In 
this method, the V-Node tests the first request from any 
source  making use of graphic turing tests like CAPTCHA to 
bring up to date the lists according to the verification process 
outcomes. 
The verification method will be applied in case the 
unmatched TTL counter does not go beyond the specified 
threshold. This will provide a new chance to the sources that 
have different TTL values to show their authenticity. The 
alteration of the TTL value between two definite ending 
points is restricted to a specified span of time by default. If 
the number of alterations goes above a specified threshold, 
then these alterations are believed to be as unusual and 
packets originating from the concerned IP address will be 
dropped without any further verification processes. The start 
time of the attack which is the moment of putting the origin 
of IP address in the blacklist is shown by the attack 
timestamp field. The objective of utilizing this field is to 
make the verification process at the V-Node undisclosed 
through the attack. For instance, if a packet appears during 
the attack's life-span with an origin of IP address that is 
present in the blacklist, it will be discarded without carrying a 
further verification method. On the contrary, in case the 
packet arrives after the attack’s lifetime, a verification test 
will be performed given the probability that it may be a 
legitimate packet [21]. The drawback to this method is the 
rising in the latency as it examines every packet that comes at 
the firewall.  
2) Sandar and Shenai Framework 
[23] suggested a method that is dependent on a firewall 
performing the function of a filter. This system comprises a 
firewall and a client puzzle server. The user’s request is 
received by the firewall which forwards it to the puzzle 
server. The user then gets a puzzle from the puzzle server to 
which he answers either correctly or wrongly. In case the 
user’s reply is correct, the puzzle server will respond 
positively to the firewall. The firewall, after putting the user 
on the white list, will pass the request to the secured server to 
obtain the required services. On the contrary, if the firewall 
gets a negative response from the puzzle service, it will black 
list the user [23].  
But this method has some shortcomings, particularly in 
dealing with the increased difficulty level of the puzzles that 
are sent to the legitimate users. Besides, this method has 
totally ignored the significance of limiting the response time 
although its inventors have evaluated the EDoS-Shield 
method, which was concerned with the solution of such 
latency [24]. 
More EDoS countermeasures: 
[12] proposed the EDoS-Shield framework which utilizes 
CAPTCHA tests to determine whether the requests are 
originated from botnets or human users. It is the predecessor 
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of their Enhanced EDoS-Shield that cannot alleviate EDoS 
attacks initiating from spoofed IP addresses as it did not 
inspect the TTL values.  Without efficiently shielding the 
target system, it only paid attention to limiting the response 
time.  
[14] suggests yet another framework called In-Cloud eDDoS 
Mitigation Web Service (Scrubber Service). This service was 
developed as on demand service. Depending on the In-Cloud 
Scrubber Service, it creates and validates the puzzles at two 
dissimilar levels of difficulty to verify the clients in 
according with the nature of attack against the protected 
mechanism. There are two kinds of techniques termed as 
suspected mode and the normal mode. But the puzzles are the 
only focus of this method although they have their own 
drawbacks. Moreover, since under this method every packet 
needs to be verified, so it seems to be limited in its approach 
as the problem of response time, i.e. amount of time a 
message takes will still exist. 
Existing Solutions Evaluation: 
There is a need to use a comparative method to assess the 
performance of the mentioned DDoS and EDoS 
countermeasures that are evaluated above. The comparison is 
conducted based on validating the packets with a number of 
techniques, defending the scalability by reducing client’s rate 
limiting, and decreasing the interval required to traverse on 
the system. The comparison process can be seen in Table 1.  
It has been observed that the current methods paid attention 
on some factors and uncared for or are unsuccessful to come 
to terms with the needs of others. So, a new framework is 
designed by the author in a way that considers the above 
features in order to fill this gap. 
 
3. The enhanced DDoS-MS Framework 
 
The assessment of the current countermeasures indicates that 
the existing alleviating methods are not adequate 
 
Table 1. Comparison between the Previous Frameworks'  
Performances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a need to propose a new solution that conducts 
strong verification of the origin of the traffic, protects the 
cloud scalability, and reducing the  time required to traverse 
the system path. The proposed mechanism is created to 
perform these functions. This system knows about the earlier 
work; it comprises the key features of previous frameworks 
and overcomes their shortcomings. The novelty of this effort 
is offering a proactive defense of the cloud provider on their 
users’ networks from the economic impact of the DDoS 
attacks by utilizing a new protection procedure, which meets 
the requirements of the above mentioned standards. 
Furthermore, for the verified clients, it will reduce the 
response time. This proposed system is termed as Enhanced 
DDoS-Mitigation System (Enhanced DDoS-MS). It is an 
improvement of the previous version (DDoS-MS) [24]. 
The design of this framework comprises five key components 
namely firewall, verifier node(s), client puzzle server, an 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) device, and a Reverse 
Proxy (RP) server in front of the shielded server(s). 
The idea of the Enhanced DDOS-MS is to examine one 
packet sent by any origin by the verifier node(s), which 
utilizes the Graphical Turing Test (GTT) in validating the 
packets. 
The precise job of the firewall is to filter the requests sent by 
the users. In the case of the requests are coming from 
illegitimate clients, the traffic will be stopped, and in the case 
of the legitimate users, the packets will be released through. 
Dependent upon the outcome of the verification procedure 
done by the verified node and monitoring methods conducted 
by the IPS and the RP, the firewall contains four lists for the 
origins of packets. These lists are white, black, suspicious, 
and malicious lists. 
The IPS device is able to inspect the packets payloads to find 
out any maliscious software utlising Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) tools. The location of the protected servers is 
concealed by The Reverse Proxy (RP) server, which also 
control the load balance between these services and checks 
the rate of the packets flow with a view to  finding out  
possible attempt of the DDoS attacks against these servies by 
establishing a pre-set threshold value for the number of  
packets from any user. Based on this pre-set threshold value, 
this attack-discovering procedure works in accordance with  
the number of packets at a particular time span. 
With this proposed solution, only the first request will be 
checked by the verifier node while an IPS and an RP will 
handle the remaining requests. In case of suspected clients 
only, the puzzle server will be utilized in this solution to 
control them when they are going beyond the threshold value 
in the reverse proxy.  
In case any malicious software is found in the packet by the 
IPS, its IP address is put on the Malicious List. Reverse 
Proxy (RP) performs the last level of the monitoring 
procedure. Suspicious clients who make attempts to devastate 
the system by sending an overwhelming number of requests 
that can pass the earlier monitoring layers are detected by the 
Reverse proxy. In this way, the origin of such suspicious 
users will be put in the Suspicious List.  
If the firewall receives any request from a suspicious user, it 
will send it onward to the client puzzle server which forwards 
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a crypto puzzle to that suspicious user with a view to 
delaying this by taking a particular duration and 
computational resources on his side with a view to defend the 
system from the threat of DDoS attacks. Unlike its usage in 
the DDoS-MS framework, the puzzles in this enhanced 
solution are utilized as a reactive measure that is only against 
the suspicious clients.  
As a result, the legitimate client will not be forced to 
undertake further tests after successfully going through the 
validation procedure. Until his legitimacy is suspected due to 
going beyond the threshold value of the traffic, or sending 
packets contains malicious software, or altering the TTL 
values of the packets, he/she will not be checked in the 
application layer using a GTT or in the network layer by the 
crypto puzzles. 
 This three-stage mechanism is aimed enabling each part to 
perform a particular function as it equally allocates the 
monitoring responsibilities among these three layers. The 
Enhanced DDoS-MS framework's design has been illustrated 
in Fig. 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Enhanced DDoS-MS Architecture 
 
The suggested system is founded on the following 
assumptions with a view to reducing its scope: 
1. The customer's system must use this framework which can 
also be utilized in the provider's system. 
2. The adversary's objective is to conduct DDoS attacks 
against the cloud to disturb its pay-per-use model by taking 
advantage of the vulnerabilities in the clients’ authentication 
system. 
3. The framework examines one packet which its gets from 
any origin, supposing that sources' IP addresses are constant 
and the packets are not fragmented, so the TTL values will 
not be altered according to the various paths the packets can 
utilize to reach to the target. 
The objective of testing only one packet and then monitoring 
the remaining packets is to improve the performance of the 
EDoS-Shield framework in the reduction of the response 
time. The function of the verifier node is to test the sources 
and differentiate between the legitimate user and the bots.  
What distinguishes the Enhanced DDoS-MS from other 
frameworks is its capability to pay attention to all three 
challenges at the same time, protecting the cloud from DDoS 
attacks, which involves tough verification procedure, defends 
the scalability advantage of the cloud and ensures reduction 
in the response time.  
The following scenarios are designed to explain the 
Enhanced DDoS-MS mechanism: 
 
A. The Scenario of testing the first packet 
1. A client forwards a request to the shielded server. 
2. The request is received by the firewall which checks its 
lists.  
3. The firewall forwards the request to the verifier node in 
case the packet source's address is not present on either list.  
4. A GTT test is sent to the client by the verifier node. 
5. The verifier node sends a positive acknowledgement to the 
firewall in case the client emerges successful in the test. In 
case of failure, a negative response is received by the 
firewall. 
6. If the verifier nod forwards a negative outcome to the  
firewall,  it will refuse the request. As a result,  the client’s IP 
address, its TTL (Time To Live) value, and the original time 
of the attack (timestamp) will be added to the black list.  
7. Otherwise, the client’s IP address and its TTL value will 
be placed in the white list.  
8. The request will be sent to the IPS device and the RP 
server respectively by the firewall down to the protected 
server. 
9.  Last but not the least, the required service will be 
provided directly to the client. 
 
B. If the source of the subsequent packets is a legitimate 
user (On the White List) 
1. The firewall checks its lists as soon as it receives the 
packets.  
2. The white list contains the packet source's address. If the 
packet's TTL value is matching to the Time to Live value 
registered on the white list, then the firewall, through the IPS 
and the RP, will pass the packet on to the protected server.  
3.  Otherwise, the request will be passed to the verifier node 
for conducting the GTT test. This measure will find out 
whether the IP address recorded on the white list is a victim 
of a spoofing attack; and stop the attacker from exploiting the 
white list addresses. 
4.  In case a negative result is forwarded to the firewall from 
the verifier node, the flow will be stopped and the client’s 
details will be excluded from white list. 
5.  Otherwise, this request is sent by the firewall with all 
subsequent requests from this client (in case their Time to 
Live values are similar to the recorded TTL values existing 
on the white list) to the protected server and  the details of  
this user are updated on the white list.  
6.   Then these packets pass through the IPS, which 
inspecting them and in case it find out malicious software 
stuff, then it stops it from proceeding further and also brings 
it to the notice of the firewall. 
7.  The malicious IP address will be moved from the white 
list (WL) to the malicious list (ML) by the firewall. 
8.  Otherwise, the flow will continue to proceed through the 
RP. If the RP detects that the number of requests is more than 
pre-set threshold value, it will stop the suspicious packets and 
bring it to the notice of the firewall. 
9.  The firewall will transfer the suspicious IP address from 
the white list (WL) to the suspicious list (SL). 
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10. Otherwise, the requests will be passed to the protected 
server and their source will get his requested service.   
 
C. If the source of the subsequent packets is on the Black 
List  
1. In this scenario, the source address of the requests lies on 
the black list; the firewall evaluates the recorded values of 
the source Time To Live, and the start time of the attack. If 
the TTL value is in accordance with the registered TTL value 
as existing on the black list, or if the initiation time of the 
request has the same start time as the previous malicious 
request, then the firewall will drop the current packet and 
update the adversary’s details on the black list.  
2. Otherwise, the firewall will forward the packet to the 
verifier node to verify it utilising a Graphical Turing Test 
(GTT). This measure gives the victim of a past spoofing 
attack an opportunity to confirm his authenticity. 
3. In case a negative outcome is received by the firewall from 
the verifier node, then the attacker’s details will be bring up 
to date on the black list and this client’s present packet will 
be dropped. 
4. Otherwise, the request will be forwarded to the protected 
server to obtain the desired services, and the client’s source 
IP address will be excluded from the blacklist. 
5. The requests will then go through the IPS, which will stop 
it from proceeding in case it finds out malicious software 
contents, and will bring it to the notice of the firewall, which 
will add this malicious IP address to the malicious list. 
6. Otherwise, the traffic will pass through the RP. If the RP 
detects that the number of packets is beyond its pre-set 
threshold value, then it will reject it and report it to the 
firewall. 
7. The suspected malicious user’s IP address will be put on 
the suspicious list (SL) by the firewall. 
8. Otherwise, the flow will be sent to the request server, and 
the needed-service and information will be sent directly to 
the client.  
 
D. If the source of the subsequent packets is a suspicious 
user (On the Suspicious List) 
1. In this situation, the source address of the suspected client 
is present on suspicious list; the packet from this source is 
forwarded to the puzzle server by the firewall. The puzzle 
server subjects the user to hard crypto puzzle checking. 
2. In case the client passes this process, the puzzle server 
forwards positive result to the firewall. If the client fails in 
this test, a negative affirmation will be sent to the firewall. 
3. The existing packet will be dropped in case the firewall 
receives a negative acknowledgement from the client puzzle 
server, and the client’s IP address will be included in the 
malicious list. In case of positive outcome, the firewall will 
forward the requests to the IPS for checking purposes. 
4. In case the IPS finds out malicious software substance in 
the packets, then it will exclude it and also report it to the 
firewall. 
5. As a result, the IP address of this sender will be moved by 
the Firewall to malicious list from the suspicious list. 
6.  Otherwise, the traffic will proceed through the RP 
checking. If the RP finds that the number of packets is 
beyond the pre-set threshold value, it will stop it from 
proceeding and will report it to the firewall. 
7. This suspicious address will be moved from suspicious list 
to the malicious list by the firewall. 
8. Otherwise, the flow will be passed to the requested server, 
and the required service and information will be forwarded 
directly to the client. 
 
E. If the source of the subsequent packets is a malicious 
user (On the Malicious List) 
In this situation, the request’s source's address is included in 
the malicious list due to clients past packets which were full 
of viruses or contained worm, or its source address was 
found to be involved in attempts to conduct DDoS attacks 
against the network and subsequently continuing with te same 
attempt to overwhelm the network, or not passing the puzzle 
checking. As a result, all incoming requests from this client 
are rejected as well as the access to the network is out rightly 
denied by the firewall. 
 
Enhanced DDoS-MS Evaluation: 
Laboratory environment, where the implementation of 
Enhanced DDoS-MS was tested, consists of three main 
domains as shown in Fig.2. The first one is the outside 
domain that represents area of not malicious end users as 
well as malicious attackers. Second one is the decision 
making domain that refers to a group of techniques that are 
used to verify the legitimacy of users such as the firewall, 
verification node, puzzle server, IPS, and the Reverse proxy.  
The last one is the protected area that incorporates protected 
servers and services. 
Multiple testing scenarios were used to prove the concept of 
the Enhanced DDoS-MS. The actual set up was based on the 
generating the traffic, from the outside domain, though 
decisions making domain into the protected domain. 
The outside domain was used as a source of traffic that sent 
to a web server in the protected area. This simple request was 
captured and recorded with low level network analyzer 
Wireshark. After that, this data were exported and used in 
traffic generator PackETH, where is a possibility to change 
the parameters of the particular packets and amplification the 
volume of the traffic. Wireshark was running on each 
interface to monitor the traffic in the testbed. The Protected 
domain in the test bed presents the area of the protected 
server. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Implementation environment for a testbed of 
Enhanced DDoS-MS 
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The Decision making domain included above mentioned 
techniques, these techniques were implemented and 
simulated by algorithm written in C++ programming 
language. For a low level packet handling, pcap and libnet 
library were used. Firewall fully implemented the decision 
process as suggested in Enhanced DDoS-MS framework. It is 
a command line-based program that has the possibility of 
showing internal actions in a terminal with setting up an 
appropriate program attribute. The internal actions of the 
firewall can be seen in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Firewall Actions 
4. Results 
In the implementation, there are two variables that will be 
compared. They are the traffic load and the traffic intensity. 
Thus, two experiments will be conducted; the first one 
involves changing the load between 500 to 5000 packets and 
fixing the intensity to be constant. In the second experiment, 
the load will be fixed to be constant at 4000 ICMP packets 
and the intensity will be changed by dividing the whole 
stream into four sub-streams and two different orders. 
The purpose of conducting the implementation in the above 
suggested way is to examine the influence of changing the 
load and the intensity on the capability of the proposed 
solution to handle the received packets at an acceptable level 
of response time beside providing the required security.  
The two experiments are described below and the main 
finding which is a comparison between the values of the 
average response time of the conducted scenarios will be 
summarized at the end of this section in order to prove the 
effectiveness of the proposed framework in decreasing the 
latency for the legitimate users regardless the change in the 
load or intensity of the received traffic.  
 
The First Experiment: 
500 ICMP packets were generated as a typical load situation 
and sent through the proposed framework to the protected 
domain. Fig. 4 shows the variance of the response time for 
500 ICMP packets.  
It is clear that the majority of the packets are completely 
served between 0.3 and 0.5 ms. The maximum response time 
is about 0.857 ms while the minimum is 0.301 ms. So, the 
average is 0.419 ms. This scenario is conducted as a base line 
of the next experimental scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Response Time Variance of 500 ICMP 
Packets 
 
To evaluate the effect of increasing the number of packets on 
the response time, the previous amount i.e., 500 packets is 
multiplied by 10 to be 5000 ICMP packets. Fig. 5 shows that 
the maximum response time is 1.014 ms for the packet 4639 
while the minimum is 0.304 ms in the packet 656. Therefore, 
the average is 0.426 ms. 
That means the response time is almost constant for the 
whole amount of the tested ICMP packets either if the sample 
is 500 or 5000 packets because the actual difference in the 
average response time is 0.007 ms (7µs). The increasing 
number of requests did not affect the response time. Thus, the 
constant average response time is a good feature of the 
protection system as it is not get to be overwhelmed by the 
higher streams. So, it can be resilient under the attacks. 
That means the response time is almost constant for the 
whole amount of the tested ICMP packets either if the sample 
is 500 or 5000 packets because the actual difference in the 
average response time is 0.007 ms (7µs). The increasing 
number of requests did not affect the response time. Thus, the 
constant average response time is a good feature of the 
protection system as it is not get to be overwhelmed by the 
higher streams. So, it can be resilient under the attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Response Time Variance of 5000 ICMP 
Packets 
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The Second Experiment 
Now, three scenarios will be conducted experimentally in 
order to evaluate the proposed framework in terms of limiting 
the response time when the received load is divided into four 
streams with different traffic intensities. Each stream has the 
same number of ICMP packets but the traffic intensity is 
different. Thus, the whole load of 4000 packets will be sent 
through the framework in burst intensities i.e., diverse 
transfer rate and in three different orders (scenarios). 
For comparison purposes, 4000 packets as one stream in a 
constant traffic intensity are sent through the firewall. Fig. 6 
shows that the maximum response time is 0.829 ms while the 
minimum is 0.304 ms. Therefore, the average is 0.426 ms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The Response Time Variance of 4000 ICMP 
Packets 
 
Actually, the majority of packets are served in a range of 0.1 
ms from the average level as shown in Table 2. It is clear 
from the table that 93.49 percent of all packets are handled 
within 0.1 ms time window from the average response time. 
Table 2. Distribution of Response Time Values of 4000 
ICMP Packets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After completing the following experiment, the average 
response time of each scenario whole load can be compared 
with its counterpart in the previous result in Fig. 6 that apply 
constant intensity and with the other different intensities 
scenarios results. Thus, the two scenarios results are 
presented and analyzed in the following part:  
 
 
 
1. First Scenario 
This scenario has four streams. Every stream consists of 4000 
requests and 4000 responses so the total number of packets is 
8000 packets. The traffic intensities of the streams are 
diverse between 50 packets per second (pps) to 1000 pps in 
the order (100 pps, 50 pps, 500 pps, 1000 pps). The variance 
of these streams is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The Response Time Variance of the First Scenario 
Streams 
 
To facilitate analyzing the results on Fig. 7, Table 3 presents 
the average, minimum and maximum response time of each 
stream as well as for the whole load. It is noticeable that 
highest intensity which is 1000 pps achieves the lowest 
average response time that is 0.41 ms. The difference 
between the average response time of the highest intensity 
and the lowest one is 0.13 ms (130 µs). The average response 
time for the whole load of streams in the current order is 0.49 
ms. 
Table 3. Summary of the First Scenario Streams Response 
Times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Second Scenario 
After presenting the above results of the first scenario, the 
second scenario shows how the change of the streams order 
can affect the framework performance. In this scenario, the 
streams will be sent in a different order. The streams order is 
rearranged to be 500, 1000, 50, and 100 pps respectively as 
stated in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Time 
Difference with 
regard to the 
Average 
Response Time 
[ms] 
Number of 
Packets 
[Responses] 
Percentage [%] 
1 252 6.30% 
0.1 443 11.08% 
0.05 817 20.43% 
-0.05 1870 46.75% 
-0.1 609 15.23% 
-1 9 0.23% 
Sum: 4000 100% 
 
 
Stream number 
Average 
response 
time [ms] 
Minimum 
response 
time [ms] 
Maximum 
response 
time 
[ms] 
Stream # 1 0.56510 0.39400 0.83000 
Stream # 2 0.54449 0.41500 0.76700 
Stream # 3 0.45389 0.33700 0.59500 
Stream # 4 0.41035 0.33300 0.54900 
Whole load 0.49347 0.33300 0.83000 
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Table 4. The Second Scenario Streams Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 that shows the variance of the streams. It is clear from 
the figure that the second stream which has the intensity of 
1000 pps achieves the lowest average response time although 
it is sent as a second stream this time not the fourth as in the 
previous scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The Response Time Variance of the Second 
Scenario Streams 
The full explanation of the streams response times is 
presented in Table 5 
 
Table 5. Summary of the Second Scenario Streams Response 
Times 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is observable from the table that the lowest intensity (50 
pps) which is represented by the third stream achieves the 
highest average response time (0.59 ms). 170 µs is the 
difference between the average response time of the second 
and third streams that represent the highest and lowest 
intensity respectively. The whole load of streams with this 
order has an average response time value of 0.52 ms. This 
proves that changing the streams order did not affect the 
average value of the response time.  
The overall findings are presented in Table 6 that compares 
the averages of response time of all streams. The average 
value is 0.48 ms for either a single stream with constant 
intensity or a load of streams (burst intensities). It means that 
the proposed framework can perform the protection function 
in a limited time window of approximately 0.05 ms (50 µs) 
from the average response time despite the variations of 
packets numbers and streams intensities. This reflects the 
effectiveness of the solution in achieving the required 
objective which is providing the security to the protected 
system besides limiting the response time for the legitimate 
users despite the diversity of the order of the received 
streams. 
 
Table 6. A Comparison of Average Response Time Values 
of the whole conducted streams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These averages are reasonable according to the different 
techniques that are implemented in the proposed system. The 
effectiveness of the Enhanced DDoS-MS framework lies on 
embracing the potential malicious and suspicious requests in 
its work flow without affecting the legitimate users neither in 
their ability to access the system at any time nor in the delay 
that has been added as a result of implementing a strong 
protection technique that ensures the availability of the 
services and protecting from the DDoS attacks and EDoS 
attacks. Moreover, the results prove the framework’s 
scalability under varied loads and traffic intensities with 
different orders. 
 
5. Open Research Issues 
 
Additional work in this project requires framework 
enhancement and comprises various conditions that were not 
studied in this research. For instance: 
1. Enhancing the current framework to include the case of 
making use of dynamic IP addresses. 
2. Involving the status of IP packet fragmentation. 
3. Selecting further packets at random for more tests. 
4. Safeguarding the cloud user's network that permits BYOD 
trend within its internal system. 
    Furthermore, the performance of the proposed solution can 
be further enhanced to render it more effective against 
genuine attacks. Adversaries are adopting improved methods 
to make their attempts of sabotage more successful. For that 
reason, upcoming research will focus on evaluating the 
proposed framework in highly developed testing scenarios, 
which may comprise multifarious complex legitimate clients 
action scenarios and various complicated malicious attack 
behavior situations: 
A. Complicated legitimate user behavior scenarios 
The client is a human being, who can err or just act not in 
usual way. At times, his/her attempts seem to be malicious 
ones despite the fact that he/she does not want to cause 
Stream 
number 
Number of 
ICMP 
requests 
send within 
the stream 
Intensity of 
packet 
generation 
per second 
within the 
stream 
Total 
number of 
packets 
Stream # 1 1000 500 2000 
Stream # 2 1000 1000 2000 
Stream # 3 1000 50 2000 
Stream # 4 1000 100 2000 
SUM 4000 - 8000 
 
 
Stream 
number 
Average 
response 
time [ms] 
Minimum 
response 
time  
[ms] 
Maximum 
response 
time 
[ms] 
Stream # 1 0.50145 0.34900 0.86800 
Stream # 2 0.41440 0.34700 0.56100 
Stream # 3 0.58858 0.42500 0.77300 
Stream # 4 0.55691 0.42300 0.75800 
Whole load 0.51535 0.34700 0.86800 
 
Stream Average Response 
Time [ms] 
4000 Packets  [1 stream] 0.42 
   The First Scenario  [4 
streams] 
0.49 
The Second Scenario [4 
streams] 
0.52 
Total Average value: 0.48 
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damage to the server: 
1. The instance of CAPTCHA test failure because of the 
keyboard issues or inadequate skills of the legitimate clients. 
The said clients will be denied access to the server despite 
the fact that they are not attackers but the existing design of 
the solution removes them from the white list. 
2. Improving the solution to take in its consideration the flash 
crowd phenomenon. In such a scenario, the legitimate clients 
successfully pass the Turing test and the other checks but 
they flood the protected server by a large number of requests 
from a large number of legitimate sources. 
B. Complex malicious attacks behavior scenarios 
Three different phases like locations, layers, and behavioral 
modifications are covered by these scenarios. Looking at the 
layers, the authors of this mechanism aim at utilizing 
attacking methods on multiple ISO/OSI layers: 
1. Safeguarding the cloud from the intricate attacks that 
initiated by taking advantage of the related shortcomings in 
multiple layers of the network targeted by the attackers. 
Attaining such effectiveness makes the solution more 
effective and provides strong defense to the cloud. 
2. Distributing the attack source’s locations through wider 
geographical ranges to emulate the persistent adversaries who 
targets to damage particular network. 
3. Modifying the attackers’ actions by exchanging the attacks 
recurrently between various groups of attackers at random 
intervals. This method renders the finding out of attack 
sources very hard. Most significantly, it renders the attack 
very difficult to be identified by the security measures that 
applied in the target's side. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Cloud computing has become an essential backbone 
infrastructure for many businesses and industries. Therefore, 
it is becoming a very important subject for security threats.  
The paper introduces an efficient method called Enhanced 
DDoS-MS that aims at protecting cloud resources against one 
of the key types of security threats, namely DDoS and EDoS 
attacks. 
The proposed method has been evaluated through a real 
setup which showed that it outperforms existing methods in 
efficiency and low delay caused by its verification stages. It 
limits the average response time despite the variations of 
packets numbers and streams intensities. This reflects the 
effectiveness of the solution in achieving the required 
objective which is providing the security to the protected 
system besides limiting the response time for the legitimate 
users despite the diversity of the loads and traffic intensities 
with different orders. 
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